Because of the way computers operate, every discrete event potentially leaves a digital trace. These digital traces must be retrieved during a digital forensic investigation to prove or refute an alleged crime. Given resource constraints, it is not always feasible (or necessary) for law enforcement to retrieve all the related digital traces and to conduct comprehensive investigations. This paper attempts to address the issue by proposing a model for conducting swift, practical and cost-effective digital forensic investigations.
Introduction
A digital forensic investigation involves the application of a series of processes on digital evidence such as identification, preservation, analysis and presentation. During the analysis process, digital forensic investigators reconstruct events in order to evaluate the truth of the forensic hypotheses related to the crime or incident based on the digital traces that have been identified and retrieved [2] . Due to inherent technological complexities, the identification and retrieval of digital traces cover a variety of techniques such as cryptography, data carving and data reconstruction. Each technique has a different level of complexity and, therefore, a different resource cost (e.g., expertise, time and tools).
Unlike physical events that are continuous, digital events are discrete and occur in temporal sequence [3] . Because of the discrete nature, it is possible to quantify the retrieval costs of individual digital traces. However, in the absence of a suitable model for digital forensic investigations, most investigators attempt to conduct a comprehensive retrieval of all related digital traces despite the substantial costs associated with retrieving all the traces.
A more effective technique is to focus only on the digital traces that can be extracted in a cost-effective manner. The reasons are that investigating different digital traces requires resources (e.g., expertise, time and tools) in different amounts, and that the traces found have different evidentiary weights with respect to proving a hypothesis. The limited resources available for an investigation renders exhaustive search approaches impractical [4] . Consequently, digital forensic investigators who endeavor to retrieve all the traces -especially those that are not sufficient to prove the hypotheses -waste valuable resources.
This paper describes a model for conducting swift, practical and costeffective digital forensic investigations. The model considers the retrieval costs of digital traces and incorporates a permutation analysis.
Preliminaries
Using the collective experience and judgment of digital forensic investigators, it is possible to rank the relative costs of investigating each trace T i (i = 1 . . . m). The relative costs may be estimated in terms of their resource requirements (person-hours, access to specialized equipment, etc.) using standard business accounting procedures. The relative costs can be ranked T 1 ≤ T 2 ≤ . . . ≤ T m without any loss of generality. As a direct consequence of this ranking, the minimum cost path for the overall investigation is uniquely identified.
Our focus is on digital traces residing on a hard disk. If the seized computer has sufficient storage, all the digital traces can be retrieved. If all the traces T i (i = 1 . . . m) are retrieved, the minimum cost path is the permutation [T 1 T 2 . . . T m ]. An example of a permutation path is shown in Figure 1 .
The number of possible paths at each step is given by m! This is a direct consequence of the fact that the problem of selecting the next available trace from an ordered permutation of m distinct traces is isomorphic to the problem of selecting the next object from a collection of m identical objects.
In order to save time and conserve resources, it is useful to determine early in an investigation whether or not the investigation should continue. This requires an estimation of the cumulative evidentiary weight associated with the investigation as W = m i=1 w i , where the (scaled) relative fractional evidentiary weight w i of each trace T i is either assigned by an expert or, by default, is set to one. The weight assignment process has to be undertaken only once as a preprocessing step for each distinct digital crime template. If the cumulative estimate W is sufficiently close to one, the prima facie of the case can probably be established. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the available digital traces are sufficient to support the case.
The difference between W and one provides a "cut-off" condition that an investigator can use to avoid identifying all the traces exhaustively. The cut-off state is illustrated using the following example. Suppose that email exchanges between the culprit and victim are vital to an investigation. The forensic goal is to confirm that the computer, which was under the culprit's control, had been used to send and receive the emails in question. Assume that the evidentiary traces are T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , T 5 with evidentiary weights 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.2, 0.35, respectively; and the evidentiary threshold is 0.85. Therefore, if all the traces are retrieved, then the estimated total evidentiary weight is 0.85, which indicates a strong case. On the other hand, if trace T 1 is not found, the overall evidentiary weight is 0.8, which is a 6% falloff. If both T 1 and T 2 are missing, the overall weight becomes 0.7, an 18% falloff. At this point, the forensic investigator should consider suspending the investigation as the prospect of successful prosecution is slim.
Missing Traces
Since a computer may not have sufficient storage, there is always the chance that some traces may be missing or overwritten. Thus, it may not be possible for an investigator to ascertain all the trace evidence pertaining to a case. Suppose a certain trace T j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is not found. Then, all the investigative paths involving T j are removed from the path diagram and the minimum cost path becomes [
The estimate of the evidentiary weight is W = m i̸ =j w i . Similarly, if two traces T j and T k (1 ≤ j; k ≤ m; j ≤ k) are not found, then all the paths involving T j or T k must be deleted and the minimum cost path is [
The estimate of the evidentiary weight is W = m i̸ =j,k w i . In general, if a total of k traces are not found (1 ≤ k < m), then all the investigative paths containing any of the k traces must be deleted from the path diagram.
It is important to consider the issue of the independence of digital traces T i . While the observations of the traces are necessarily independent because they are performed individually post mortem, the digital traces must be created independently if the model is to retain its validity. Since it is possible in principle for one user action to create multiple digital traces T i (which are not mutually independent), care must be taken to ensure the independence of the expected digital traces when selecting the set of traces.
Investigation Model
The model for conducting cost-effective digital forensic investigations has two phases.
Phase 1 (Preprocessing -Detecting Traces)
Enumerate the set of traces expected to be present based on the type of crime suspected. Assign relative investigation costs to each expected trace. Rank the expected traces in order of increasing relative investigation costs. Assign relative evidentiary weights w i to each ranked trace. Rank the expected traces within each cost band in order of decreasing relative evidentiary weight. Set the cumulative evidentiary weight estimate W to zero. Set the total of the remaining available weights W rem to one. For each expected trace taken in ranked order:
-Search for the expected trace.
-Subtract the relative evidentiary weight w i of the trace from W rem .
-If the expected trace is retrieved, add its relative evidentiary weight w i to W .
-If W is sufficiently close to one, proceed to Phase 2.
-If W + W rem is not close enough to one, abandon the forensic investigation.
Phase 2 (Bayesian Network -Analyzing Traces)
Run and analyze the Bayesian network model for the crime hypothesis using the retrieved traces as evidence (as described in [6] ).
BitTorrent Case Study
This section uses a BitTorrent case study [6] to demonstrate the costeffective digital forensic investigation model. Figure 2 shows a Bayesian network with eighteen expected evidence traces (E i ) and their relationships to the five hypotheses (H i ). The Bayesian network is constructed by enumerating every path through which an evidentiary trace could have been produced and assigning it a probability.
The ideal case, in which all eighteen evidence traces are retrieved, is shown in Table 1 . Note that each piece of trace evidence E i is ranked according to its cost T j .
The actual case, corresponding to a situation where two of the expected traces (E 8 and E 14 ) are missing, is shown in Table 2 .
A potential complication involving the proposed investigation model should be noted. A trace could initially be assigned a low cost; however, upon further consideration, it could be determined that the cost is much higher. Examples of such a situation are a file that turns out to be protected by encryption or a partition that turns out to be deleted. In such cases, the cost of investigating the trace must be revised and all the traces must be ranked again based on the revised costs. This is necessary to maintain the minimum cost strategy for the investigation.
Constructing a Bayesian network model corresponding to an investigation requires the definition of the overall structure of the network, including the hierarchy of hypotheses and the associated posterior digital evidence (or traces) whose presence or absence determines the prior probabilities of the corresponding hypotheses. Next, numerical values are assigned to the prior probabilities. Traditionally, forensic investigators assign the prior probabilities based their expertise and experience. However, these assessments have been challenged in judicial proceedings primarily on the grounds that they are non-rigorous and subjective.
These challenges can be countered if a rigorous analytic procedure is used to quantitatively assign the prior probabilities. A promising approach is to use complexity theory [7] . Essentially, every path by which an evidential trace could have been produced is enumerated, and the probability associated with each path is evaluated using techniques from complexity theory. We illustrate the approach using an example from the BitTorrent case. In particular, we evaluate the prior probability that hypothesis H 2 is true given that trace evidence E 8 (i.e., T 5 ) is found (Figure 2 ). E 8 is the evidence that the torrent file is present on the hard disk of the seized computer.
Three scenarios that result in the presence of the torrent file are:
The file was placed on the seized computer by a covert malware process.
The file was copied or downloaded to the seized computer from some other source.
The file was created on the seized computer from the pirated file.
Assume that a state-of-the-art, anti-malware scan reveals the presence of a Trojan with a probability of approximately 0.98 [5] . Additionally, a thorough, careful inventory of the local networked drives and portable storage media reveals the presence of a source copy of the torrent file with a probability greater than 0.95. Furthermore, a high-quality search engine detects the presence of a downloadable copy of the torrent file with a similar probability [1] . As a result, the probability that the torrent file was created in situ on the hard disk of the seized computer is at least 0.88. The error bars for the assigned probabilities are derived assuming that the errors are normally distributed. Based on these assignments, we obtain a probability value of 0.94 ± 0.06.
Conclusions
The proposed two-phase digital forensic investigation model achieves the twin goals of reliability and cost-effectiveness by incorporating a preprocessing phase, which runs in parallel with the data collection phase. The evidentiary weighting and cost ranking of the expected traces, which are undertaken only once for all similar investigations, enable the lowest cost traces to be examined first. This means that the "best-case" and "worst-case" scenarios can be processed efficiently. The combined use of evidentiary weights and ranked costs enables an ultimately futile investigation to be detected early and abandoned using only low cost traces. By the same token, an investigation that would ultimately prove to be unsuccessful could be halted before any high cost traces are investigated.
This model performs best in cases where the distributions of evidentiary weights versus costs are skewed towards low costs, and it performs the worst when the distributions are skewed towards high costs. In the average case, where the distribution is essentially unskewed (or even uniform), the model exhibits intermediate performance. However, it should be noted that, even in the most pathological cases, the performance would not be significantly worse than the current exhaustive or random search for traces.
One of the main advantages of the model is that it offers the possibility of creating templates of expected traces and their associated costs and evidentiary weights for every type of digital crime. These templates can provide investigators with benchmarks for calibrating their investigative procedures, and also offer novice investigators with an investigative model that can be adopted in its entirety.
Introduction
Scientific conclusions based on evidence have been used for many years in forensic investigations. In making their assessments, investigators consider the available facts and the likelihood that they support or refute hypotheses related to a case. Investigators recognize that there is never absolute certainty and seek a degree of confidence with which to establish their hypotheses [2] .
A forensic investigation determines the likelihood of a crime through the analysis and interpretation of evidence. To this end, a forensic investigation focuses on the validation of hypotheses based on the evidence and the evaluation of the likelihood that the hypotheses support legal arguments [6, 10, 12, 14, 15] . The likelihood represents the degree of belief in the truth of the associated hypothesis. It is typically expressed as a probability and probabilistic methods may be used to deduce the likelihood of a hypothesis based on the available evidence [7, 9] .
A crime and its associated digital evidence are usually linked by subhypotheses. This paper uses a Bayesian network [8] to analyze and reason about the evidence in the well-known Yahoo! Case [3] .
In the Yahoo! Case, Yahoo! Holdings (Hong Kong) Limited (Yahoo! HHKL) supplied IP address information to Chinese authorities that led to the conviction of Shi Tao, a Chinese journalist, for sending confidential state information to foreign entities. Shi Tao received a 10-year sentence for his crime. Shi Tao's authorized representative in Hong Kong subsequently lodged a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data. The complaint maintained that Yahoo! HHKL disclosed Shi Tao's "personal data" to Chinese authorities, which was a breach of the Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.
The investigation by the Privacy Commissioner concluded that an IP address, on its own, does not constitute personal data [13] . The conclusion was based on the position that an IP address is unique to a specific computer not a person and, therefore, does not meet the definition of personal data. The Privacy Commissioner also held that no safe conclusion could be drawn that user data corresponding to the IP address belonged to a living individual as opposed to a corporate or unincorporated body, or that it was related to a real as opposed to a fictitious individual.
We use Bayesian network inference to assess the evidentiary weight of the IP address in the Yahoo! Case. Four scenarios are evaluated:
Yahoo! HHKL and the ISP participate in the investigation; all the digital evidence is available.
Yahoo! HHKL participates in the investigation; digital evidence regarding the IP address is received from Yahoo! HHKL. However, the ISP does not participate in the investigation.
Yahoo! HHKL does not participate in the investigation; digital evidence regarding the IP address is not received from Yahoo! HHKL. However, the ISP participates in the investigation.
Yahoo! HHKL and the ISP do not participate in the investigation; no digital evidence regarding the IP address is available.
Although an IP address, by itself, is not viewed as personal data, our analysis shows that it carried significant evidentiary weight in the Yahoo! Case. Our analysis is based on the "Reasons for Conviction" [4] , and the Administrative Appeals Board decision [1] regarding the Report of the Hong Kong Privacy Commissioner published under Section 48(2) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Chapter 486) [13] . 
Digital Evidence in the Yahoo! Case
In the Yahoo! Case, the Changsha Intermediate People's Court of Hunan Province convicted Shi Tao of providing state secrets to foreign entities. Based on the data provided by Yahoo! HHKL, the court determined that at approximately 11:32 pm on April 20, 2004, Shi Tao used a computer in his employer's office to access his personal email account (huoyan-1989@yahoo.com.cn) via the Yahoo! webmail interface and send some notes regarding a summary of a top-secret document issued by the Chinese Government to the email account of Hong Zhesheng (caryhung@aol.com) [13] . Shi Tao asked Hong Zhesheng, who resided in New York, to find a way to distribute the notes as quickly as possible without using Shi Tao's name [5] . Figure 1 shows the entities and events involved in the email transmission from Shi Tao to Hong Zhesheng. Based on this description, a digital forensic investigator would be required to ascertain the following facts:
1. Shi Tao had access to a computer connected to the Internet. 6. The web browser program sent an HTTP request to the Yahoo! mail server. When the requested web page was retrieved, it was displayed by the web browser program.
7. Shi Tao entered his user name and password to log into his email account. Based on the email subscription details, the Yahoo! mail server authenticated Shi Tao and allowed him to log into his email folder.
8. Shi Tao composed the email, attached the file and entered Hong Zhesheng's AOL email address. He then clicked the "Send" button to transmit the email along with the file attachment. Since Shi Tao used a web browser program to create the email, the email content was (possibly) cached in Shi Tao's computer.
9. The Yahoo! email server stored the email and the attachment, and placed it in the message queue for transmission to Hong Zhesheng's AOL email server via SMTP.
Evaluation of Digital Evidence
In general, an investigation must clarify a number of issues before a case can be brought to court. These issues include whether or not a crime was committed, how the crime was committed, who committed the crime and whether or not there is a reasonable chance of conviction.
We use a Bayesian network to quantify the evidentiary strengths of hypotheses and to reason about evidence. A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph whose edges indicate dependencies between nodes.
Each node is accompanied by a conditional probability table (CPT) that describes the dependencies between nodes. In our work, the nodes correspond to hypotheses and the digital evidence associated with hypotheses. The edges connect each hypothesis to the evidence that should be present if the hypothesis is valid.
Bayesian Network
The first step in constructing a Bayesian network for analyzing digital evidence in the Yahoo! Case involves the definition of the primary hypothesis (H ), the main issue to be determined. In the Yahoo! Case, the primary hypothesis is: "The seized computer was used to send the material document as an email attachment using a Yahoo! webmail account."
The next step is to define the possible states of the hypothesis (Yes, No and Uncertain). Probability values are then assigned to each state. Each of these values represents the prior probability that the hypothesis is in the specific state. The prior probability of H, P (H), is assumed to be equal to (0.333, 0.333, 0.333), i.e., all three states are equally likely.
The hypothesis H is the root node in the Bayesian network. Subhypotheses that are causally dependent on the hypothesis assist in proving the hypothesis. The sub-hypotheses and the associated evidence and events are represented as child nodes in the Bayesian network. Figure 1 lists six sub-hypotheses that support the primary hypothesis H in the Yahoo! Case. The six sub-hypotheses are:
Linkage between the material document and the suspect's computer (Table 1) .
Linkage between the suspect and the computer ( Table 2) .
Linkage between the suspect and the ISP (Table 3) .
Linkage between the suspect and the Yahoo! email account (Table 4) .
Linkage between the computer and the ISP (Table 5 ).
H 6 : Linkage between the computer and the Yahoo! email account ( Table 6 ).
The evidence and events for the six sub-hypotheses are listed in Tables  1-6 .
The states of the various sub-hypotheses are dependent on the state of H. Each sub-hypothesis, which is a child node of H, has an associated conditional probability table (CPT). The CPT contains the prior Table 1 . H1: Linkage between the material document and the suspect's computer.
ID
Evidence Description Type DE1 Subject file exists on the computer Digital DE2 Last access time of the subject file is after the IP address assignment time by the ISP Digital DE3 Last access time of the subject file matches or is close to the sent time of the Yahoo! email Digital Table 2 . H2: Linkage between the suspect and the computer.
ID Evidence Description Type
PE1 Suspect was in physical possession of the computer Physical DE4 Files on the computer reveal the identity of the suspect Digital Table 3 . H3: Linkage between the suspect and the ISP.
DE5 ISP subscription details match the suspect's particulars Digital Table 4 . H4: Linkage between the suspect and the Yahoo! email account.
DE6 Subscription details of the Yahoo! email account match the suspect's particulars Digital Table 5 . H5: Linkage between the computer and the ISP. We assume that all the sub-hypotheses (H 1 . . . H 6 ) have the CPT values shown in Table 7 . For example, an initial value of 0.6 is assigned for the situation where H and H 1 are Yes. This means that when the seized computer was used to send the material document as an email attachment using a Yahoo! webmail account, the probability that a linkage existed between the material document and the seized computer is 0.6. Additionally, there may be instances where it is not possible to confirm a Yes or No state for H 1 from the evidence although the seized computer was used to send the document. This uncertainty is modeled by assigning a probability of 0.05 to the Uncertain state.
After assigning conditional probabilities to the sub-hypotheses, the observable evidence and events related to each sub-hypothesis are added to the Bayesian network. For reasons of space, we only discuss Hypothesis H 1 (Linkage between the material document and the seized computer) in detail to demonstrate the use of a Bayesian network.
The evidence for H 1 that establishes the linkage between the material document and the seized computer includes: (i) the subject file exists on the computer; (ii) the last access time of the subject file is after the IP address assignment time by the ISP; and (iii) the last access time of The next step is to assign conditional probability values to the evidence. Table 8 shows the conditional probability values of evidence E 1 , E 2 and E 3 given specific states of Hypothesis H 1 .
After conditional probabilities are assigned to the entailing evidence, it is possible to propagate probabilities within the Bayesian network. In particular, the likelihood of H 1 is computed based on the observed probability values of evidence E 1 , E 2 and E 3 . The well-known MSBNX program [11] was used to propagate probabilities in the Bayesian network developed for the Yahoo! Case.
If evidence E 1 , E 2 and E 3 have Yes states, then the digital forensic investigator can confirm that there is a likelihood of 99.6% that Hypothesis H 1 (Linkage between the material document and the suspect's computer) is true. Furthermore, based on the 99.6% likelihood for H 1 , the investigator can also conclude that there is a 59.9% likelihood that H (The seized computer was used to send the material document as an email attachment using a Yahoo! webmail account) is true. Figure 2 shows the Bayesian network when E 1 , E 2 and E 3 all have Yes states.
The same methodology is used to compute the likelihoods of the other five sub-hypotheses based on the probability values of the associated evidentiary nodes. Finally, the likelihoods of the six sub-hypotheses are used to compute the overall likelihood of the primary hypothesis.
Impact of the IP Address
In order to assess the evidentiary weight of the IP address in the Yahoo! Case, we identify four scenarios that involve differing amounts of evidence provided to the Chinese authorities by Yahoo! HHKL and the ISP. Tables 1-6 is available and is true, the likelihood of Hypothesis H is 90.5%.
Scenario 2:
In this scenario, the ISP does not participate in the investigation. The evidentiary items DE5 (Table 3 ) and DE11 (Table 5 ) are missing. The corresponding likelihood of Hypothesis H is 88.1%.
Scenario 3:
In this scenario, Yahoo! HHKL does not participate in the investigation. The evidentiary items DE6 (Table 4) and DE14 (Table 6 ) are missing. The corresponding likelihood of Hypothesis H is 83.0%.
Scenario 4:
In this scenario, Yahoo! HHKL and the ISP do not participate in the investigation. Evidentiary items DE5 (Table 3) , DE6 (Table 4) , DE11 (Table 5 ) and DE14 (DE14) are missing. The corresponding likelihood of Hypothesis H is 78.7%. Table 9 lists the four scenarios and their likelihoods. Note that the availability of the IP address affects the likelihood by 11.7%. In particular, the likelihood is 90.5% (very likely) when all the evidence is available, but it drops to 78.7% (probable) when evidence related to the IP address is not available. Although the IP address by itself does not reveal the identity of a specific user, it provides additional information that can further confirm the identity of the user.
The Reasons for Verdict [5] in the Yahoo! Case identified six primary facts:
Fact 1: Shi Tao attended the press briefing and obtained the information. Fact 2: Shi Tao was present in the office of his employer at the material time.
Fact 3: Shi Tao was the only employee who knew the information.
Fact 4:
The office of the employer was the registration address for the IP address.
Fact 5: The IP address was assigned to the employer at the time the email was sent.
Fact 6:
The email was sent from the material IP address.
We developed a Bayesian network modeling these facts to evaluate the hypothesis: "Shi Tao sent the material email at the material time from the office of his employer." Experiments with the Bayesian network indicate that when all six facts are completely supported, the likelihood of Hypothesis H is 99.9%. However, when the IP address is missing (i.e., Facts 4-6 relating to the IP address are Uncertain), the overall likelihood drops to 14.9%, a reduction of 85.0%. This drop underscores the importance of the IP address in obtaining a conviction in the Yahoo! Case.
Conclusions
Bayesian networks provide a powerful mechanism for quantifying the evidentiary strengths of investigative hypotheses and reasoning about evidence. The application of a Bayesian network to analyze digital evidence related to the Yahoo! Case demonstrates that the IP address was significant to obtaining a conviction. Investigators and prosecutors can use this technique very effectively to evaluate the impact of specific evidentiary items before a case is brought to court.
